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The Manhattan Project, America’s herculean effort to build an atomic bomb, has been the subject of 
much scholarship, most of which has focused on its international dimensions. In The Prometheus Bomb: 
The Manhattan Project and Government in the Dark, Neil J. Sullivan discusses the atomic bomb 
program’s impact on public policymaking and democratic governance in the United States. By examining 
the secret decision-making process that made the United States a nuclear power within the context of a 
historical discussion of the Madisonian system—the way the nation’s Founders intended policymaking 
to function—Sullivan analyzes the unprecedented policymaking challenges faced by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and his advisers. 
How the Roosevelt administration responded to these challenges was not just important to explaining 
why the Manhattan Project succeeded in making the United States a nuclear power. Sullivan asserts that 
secretive wartime decision-making created precedents for how modern presidents have engaged in 
policymaking. An examination of the Manhattan Project, Sullivan explains, reveals an important goal for 
contemporary American democracy, the need to “strike a balance in our government between authority 
and restrain in the face of scientific challenges the framers of the Constitution could not have imagined” 
(p. 7). The result of this examination is a persuasive, engaging, and highly readable book that experts 
and nonexperts alike will appreciate and enjoy. 
Sullivan begins with one of the first critical events in the atomic bomb program, the initiation of a chain 
reaction at the University of Chicago in 1942. Sullivan’s highly engaging description of this momentous 
event emphasizes how incredibly dangerous it was to conduct this experiment in a densely populated 
area. Enrico Fermi and Arthur Holly Compton, the Nobel Prize– winning physicists who led the 
experiment, knew the risks involved but did not fully inform Robert Hutchins, the University of Chicago’s 
president, of the potential dangers involved. Hutchins knew the experiment was dangerous, but he did 
not know enough to grant informed consent to allow the experiment to be conducted on his campus. 
There was also no effort made to solicit public participation or consent in the decision to carry out an 
experiment that no one was sure could be carried out safely. 
Why was there such a rush to try to build an atomic bomb? Because, as Sullivan explains, scientists and 
American policymakers were sure that Nazi Germany was engaged in an intensive effort to build its own 
atomic bomb. The Roosevelt administration, Sullivan contends, confronted a new type of public choice, 
“life and death on a national scale” (p. 7). The Manhattan Project “established patterns of authority, 
models of organization, and a culture of secrecy” that were perhaps at the time necessary to confront 
the potential danger of a Nazi bomb, but which also led to the suspension of democratic norms and 
tradition (p. 5). 
The Prometheus Bomb is an important contribution to our current understanding of the Manhattan 
Project, but it does have its faults. Though Sullivan is correct when he contends that Roosevelt lacked 
sufficient knowledge to make science-based decisions, the president did understand that the U.S. 
government needed to create a stronger synergy between government and science, hence the creation 
of the Office of Strategic Research and Development (OSRD) in June 1941. While Sullivan does discuss 
the creation of the OSRD, he does not sufficiently explain its creation in the context of the Roosevelt 
administration’s larger strategic thinking about the future role of science and technology in national 
security policymaking. Nevertheless, The Prometheus Bomb ought to be read by anyone interested in 
the Manhattan Project.  
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